INTRODUCTION
Does U.S. manufacturing need saving? It would seem so, given recent rhetoric from Washington. The discussion dominated the debates leading up to the 2008 presidential election,' and many government officials have made "'saving U.S. manufacturing' and 'leveling the playing field' on trade for American business" their top priority. 2 The proponents of reform cite current trade policies as a significant contributor to the decline of the U.S. manufacturing sector and the loss of employment accompanying that decline. The fear is that the U.S. manufacturing sector is slowly eroding, and that this could have serious, long-term consequences for the rest of the economy. With President Obama settling into office, the question remains what actions, if any, will ultimately be taken to deal with this so-called "problem?"
Currently, most discussions concerning the viability of U.S. trade policy focus on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its dramatic effect on the U.S. economy. The sheer scope of the agreement, and its subsequent influence on other trade agreements, has made it something of a lighting rod. On the one hand, NAFTA's opponents directly attribute the downfall of U.S. manufacturing to the rapid movement of labor jobs to Canada and Mexico that occurred after the agreement was signed. 4 to the U.S. economy.
This Note has two goals. First, it seeks to highlight the current state of U.S. trade by focusing on the proliferation of U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Specifically, it looks to NAFTA and suggests that, regardless of the other benefits offered by the agreement, it has devastated U.S. manufacturing.' 5 It suggests that under the current system, U.S. manufacturers are unable to effectively compete in the global economy, and that the resulting shift in employment away from the manufacturing sector has had a significant impact on displaced individuals as well as the rest of the economy.' 6 Finally, it concludes that free trade is a direct threat to the U.S. manufacturing sector and any discussion about "saving" U.S. manufacturing must specifically address this threat."
Secondly, this Note highlights TAP, a trade proposal aimed directly at the U.S. manufacturing sector. It addresses the proposal's ability to look past the free trade debate and target a key incentive causing U.S. manufacturers to leave the U.S. economy. Furthermore, it suggests that TAP will immediately reinvigorate the United States Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) program by providing aid to U.S. manufacturers competing in the global economy.' 8 Finally, it emphasizes that TAP is one example of how U.S. trade policies can be retooled to benefit the American worker without artificially constraining the benefits of free trade.' 9 Part I discusses the United States' trade policies and the current push toward pursuing free trade agreements with additional countries. Part II looks at the controversy surrounding NAFTA and discusses NAFTA's effect on the U.S. manufacturing sector. Part III discusses the effects of the shift of employment from the U.S. manufacturing sector to other sectors of the economy. Part IV discusses the debate between the promotion of free trade and the protection against the harmful effects of practicing free trade. Part V describes the TAP proposal and the potential benefits offered by the legislation. Finally, Part VI proposes that Congress immediately consider the passage of TAP.
PART 1: THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. TRADE Before asking the question, "Does U.S. manufacturing need saving," we must first clearly define that which threatens it. A popular answer focuses on the attractive incentives currently offered to U.S. manufacturers 19.See Berry, supra note 2. 20 who move their production facilities out of U.S. territory. Many economists blame current free trade agreements for introducing these incentives into the U.S. economy. 2 1 While it is unclear how much of the manufacturing sector has been lost to the practice of free trade, several estimates attribute over one million jobs to NAFTA alone. 22 Because these estimates stand in direct opposition to both the net increase in U.S. employment that has occurred over the last two decades, 23 and the undeniable benefits of free trade in general, 24 perhaps it is easy to dismiss these losses as a necessary casualty of globalization. However, clearly defining the United States' role in the international free trade arena should aid in appreciating the nature of this growing threat to U.S. manufacturing.
With the passage of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1985,25 the United States formally became a player in the free trade movement.
2 6 It was not long after the passage of this agreement that the United States sought expansion of its trade relationships with its geographic neighbors, Canada and Mexico. 27 Ultimately, these discussions culminated in the passage of the largest trade agreement the United States is party to, NAFTA, in 1993. 28 The United State's pursuit of free trade rapidly accelerated after the passage of NAFTA. In particular, the U.S. government actively expanded free trade relationships during the George W. Bush administration.
2 9 After the passage of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 2002,30 the Bush administration was able to "fast track" a total of six free trade agreements. ' Today, the United States maintains free trade relationships with The United States' pursuit of free trade has been so rapid that it has become somewhat of a standardized process. Specifically, the National Security Council has developed set criteria that govern the selection of trading partners.
Additionally, the agreements with the countries listed above share common elements and the general framework pioneered by NAFTA.
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With each agreement, the United States successfully implements a specific model that expands free trade while mandating certain absolute requirements.
Given the debate surrounding the viability of NAFTA, and its influence on subsequently adopted trade agreements, hopefully it is clear why studying NAFTA in particular has merit. Even so, there are several additional reasons why the following discussion focuses on NAFTA. First, it is the largest free trade agreement to which the United States is currently a party and it represents a significant portion of the country's total trade. Additionally, the agreement created the largest free trading block in the world, and closely linked the U.S. economy with the economies of Mexico and Canada. Furthermore, the United States' NAFTA partners directly benefited from the erosion of the U.S. manufacturing base that occurred after the agreement was passed. Finally, President Obama has recently added to the NAFTA controversy by suggesting that one million jobs have been lost as a direct consequence of the agreement. 39 Engaging each side of the NAFTA debate as it pertains to U.S. manufacturing highlights the path annual benefit to the average family of four. 4 9 It further estimates that the implementation of the trade agreement has meant that an average family of four has paid $210 less in taxes annually.so Finally, the USTR directly refutes claims that NAFTA has hurt the American manufacturing base." It emphasizes that under NAFTA, U.S. manufacturing output has risen some 58%, with exports reaching an all-time high in 2007, valuing $982 billion.
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Considering these claims, it would seem that NAFTA has met the lofty goals initially set, and its threat to U.S. manufacturing is overstated. However, many economists have vehemently opposed the USTR's position. In fact, many predicted that the agreement would be harmful to U.S. employment from the very beginning. Famously, former presidential candidate Ross Perot claimed that NAFTA would produce "a great sucking sound" characterized by the number of jobs leaving the United States. 53 Furthermore, since the agreement's inception it has been a consistent target of attack by commentators citing the negative reverberations felt in various sectors of the economy.
In short, the two sides of the NAFTA debate can be characterized as those seeking to promote free trade versus those concerned with protecting against its harmful effects. Looking at each side of the argument in the NAFTA context sheds light on the actual, if uncertain, impact U.S.-FTAs are having on the U.S. manufacturing sector.
A. Opposition to NAFTA
Several economists believe that NAFTA can be directly linked with job loss and growing inequality between socio-economic classes. 54 These economists generally disagree with the USTR's claim that NAFTA has been an undeniable success. Jeff Faux, former president of the Economic Policy Institute, specifically takes issue with how the agreement was sold to the citizens of all three nations.s He claims that each nation promised their citizens that the agreement "would bring large net benefits in better jobs and faster growth," 56 and that these promises were not necessarily delivered. Faux argues that the net result of the agreement was not the introduction of better jobs, but the net loss of jobs and a shift in the proportion of income toward the wealthiest social classes. Faux believes this movement has displaced significant numbers of manufacturing workers, many of whom have less than a college education." Because of this limited education, Faux argues that these displaced laborers are unable to gain access to the specialized jobs that are actually being created by free trade. Consequently, Faux concludes that a major portion of the population is not able to benefit and is, in fact, injured by NAFTA and free trade in general. 59 Faux is not alone in linking NAFTA with the decline of the U.S. manufacturing sector. Several commentators have reached a similar conclusion pointing to the nation's growing trade deficit as the link between NAFTA and manufacturing job loss.
6 0 These commentators point to the very basic principle that "[I]ncreases in U.S. exports tend to create jobs in this country, but increases in imports tend to reduce jobs because the imports displace goods that otherwise would have been" produced domestically by U.S. workers. 6 1 Because the U.S. trade deficit ballooned after the passage of NAFTA, these critics blame the agreement for manufacturing job losses. Economist Robert Scott, who believes job losses from NAFTA have totaled more than one million, seems to believe that initial estimates as to NAFTA's impact on the trade deficit were flawed. He highlights the fact that the predicted benefits of NAFTA were conditioned upon the belief that "U.S. exports to Mexico would grow faster than imports."64 In other words, the thought was that NAFTA would have a positive effect on the U.S. trade deficit. Specifically, Scott cites an estimate that claimed the trade deficit would be improved by nine billion dollars once NAFTA took effect. 65 In reality, the deficit was not improved at all. One study reflects that the deficit rose $107. 3 While Scott believes the U.S. trade deficit has impacted all areas of the economy, he thinks the manufacturing sector, in particular, has been affected.'6 He claims that "[R]apid expansion of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico, Canada, and the world as a whole since NAFTA took effect in 1994 has contributed to the contraction of U.S. manufacturing industries, which lost 3.3 million jobs between 1998 and 2004."69 He believes that the effects of the trade deficit on U.S. manufacturing are finally receiving attention now that job growth has dried up in other areas of the economy. Furthermore, Scott emphasizes that one effect of the agreement was the widespread shift of assembly positions in the U.S. manufacturing sector to our NAFTA partners. 7 ' He argues that the United States has been relegated to an exporter of parts and components to other countries where they are assembled into final products before returning to the United States for 72 consumption.
In other words, Scott believes that the workers once employed to assemble parts on U.S. soil have lost their jobs to assembly facilities abroad.
Although arriving at a slightly different conclusion, Josh Bivens, an economist with the Economic Policy Institute, has made similar findings concerning the nation's trade deficit. 74 He concludes that the trade deficit that exploded after the passage of NAFTA is one of the major causes of the rapid decline of U.S. manufacturing. 75 Bivens cites evidence showing that trade imbalances in manufacturing have accounted for 58% of the total decline in manufacturing employment since 1998.76 While he does not believe the losses have been exclusively caused by the growing trade deficit, Bivens believes that NAFTA's trade imbalance is directly responsible for manufacturing job loss.
Bivens supports his findings by identifying three factors that influence the number of manufacturing positions available at a given time. 77 These factors are demand, productivity, and international trade. 78 He does not believe that the domestic demand for manufactured goods has declined and therefore cannot explain job loss. 79 productivity could have increased enough to account for the sheer quantity of manufacturing losses. 80 This leads him to blame international trade for causing U.S. manufacturing output to decline to 76.5% of domestic demand, a 14% decline compared to the average production statistics between the years of 1987 and 1997." Bivens concludes that international trade, specifically the growing number of net imports, is responsible for the decline of domestic output and therefore, at least one of the causes of U.S. manufacturing job loss.
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B. Advocates ofNAFTA
Other economists oppose the findings of NAFTA's critics, choosing to focus on the benefits of the agreement. Some have adopted the findings of the USTR, while others claim that if nothing else, the agreement accelerated and codified a process of economic integration that was already taking place in North America.
83
Jeffrey Schott, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has devoted much of his time to defending the benefits that the agreement has secured for the country.84 In a 2008 publication, Schott argues that NAFTA has largely met the lofty claims set by the architects of the agreement. 8 ' He asserts that the three member nations have become sufficiently integrated, and the goals set forth in NAFTA's Article 102 have been met. Schott cites statistics showing that the trilateral merchandise trade has tripled since the inception of the agreement in 1993.87 These numbers reflect that in 1993, trade between the three countries, including both imports and exports, totaled $300 billion. That number was projected to approach one trillion dollars in 2008.
Typically, NAFTA proponents believe that the agreement has benefitted the U.S. employment picture. 90 Schott believes that overall employment has risen in all three countries since the agreement's inception. 9 94 As far as the specific effects on U.S. manufacturing employment, Schott attributes some losses to NAFTA, but emphasizes that even in the worst year of NAFTArelated job losses, these losses represent less than one percent of U.S. annual job loss. 95 Several economists refute the charge that the nation's trading deficit is a sign of NAFTA's failure. Robert Blecker, a professor of economics at American University, believes that the trade deficits the United States has accumulated with both Mexico and Canada must be viewed in the context of a growing U.S. trade deficit with all trading partners.
9 7 In other words, Blecker is not ready to blame NAFTA exclusively for the escalating trade deficit. He suggests that this phenomenon is not directly attributable to the effects of the agreement alone because the United States has growing deficits with all of its trading partners. 98 Blecker contends that when comparing the trade deficits with Mexico or Canada, neither is greater than any other major U.S. trading partner from 1993 to 2003.99 From this, Blecker concludes that "trade within North America (and indeed, with the entire western hemisphere) is relatively more of a two-way street for the United States than trade with most other countries and regions, and this has been true since before NAFTA went into effect."' 00 Blecker does not deny that a significant number of U.S. manufacturing jobs have been lost since NAFTA's passage, but he believes that the U.S. labor sector has been affected by other factors independent of NAFTA, and therefore, refuses to blame the agreement.'o' In his view, the extent of labor dislocation is more affected by the performance of the economies of each member nation rather than the impact of the liberalization of trade between them. In sum, NAFTA proponents tend to believe that international trade has been a minimal factor in U.S. job loss.'" Because of this, many oppose changing or restricting the benefits of free trade agreements in any way. Instead of focusing on the effects of trade, NAFTA proponents believe the focus should be on several other factors that have contributed to the steady loss of manufacturing jobs over the last half-century. For example, and in direct contrast to Bivens' findings, 0 5 some commentators have found that the steady loss of manufacturing jobs is largely attributable to massive productivity growth that occurred over the same period of time.' 0 o Brink Lindsey' 0 7 summed the argument up by saying, " [T] rade is only one element in a much bigger picture of incessant turnover in the U.S. job market." 0 8
PART III: EFFECTS OF THE U.S. MANUFACTURING JOB SHIFT
In the context of U.S. manufacturing, the two sides of the NAFTA debate, and the larger free trade debate in general, are not entirely incompatible. Each seems to agree that NAFTA, at least to some degree, has affected the U.S. manufacturing sector.' 09 The main difference between the two views is how significant the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment is, and furthermore, whether NAFTA's benefits outweigh the negative effects of these losses."o While there may be no consensus, simply ignoring the displacement of manufacturing workers in favor of a focus on NAFTA's "net" results on U.S. employment marginalizes a major concern.Ill Taking a brief look at statistics illustrates the potential problem with focusing on "net" employment results. In 2003, roughly 14.3 million U.S. This number remains relevant today given that growth in the U.S. manufacturing sector has largely been stagnant since 2003.114 Given the high employment levels relative to the NAFTA timeline, it is difficult to make a coherent argument that these workers have not been shifted to other sectors of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, while such a shift maintains desirable employment statistics, it says nothing about the salaries available to those workers being shifted away from the manufacturing sector. Specifically, questions remain as to what types of jobs these displaced workers were able to procure after leaving the manufacturing sector, and what effect, if any, does this shift have on the rest of the economy?
103.
Statistics suggest that the impact has been substantial."
5 The American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC) claims that the average manufacturing job produces an income some 33% higher than a service sector job, and that industrial job losses have had a drastic impact on wage growth for U.S. employees."' 6 The impact on wage growth is caused when a work-capable individual loses their high paying manufacturing job and is funneled into low paying positions in the service sector.11 7 A recent U.S. government forecast reveals that job creation in the next decade will be dominated by low-end service sector positions in the restaurant and retail sectors of the economy."' 8 This prediction supports the claim that a substantial portion of the U.S. manufacturing workforce is shifting into lower paying employment positions.
A decrease in earning power by a significant portion of the population has obvious effects on other economic sectors. For example, less earning and, therefore, less spending could be detrimental to the retail industry. However, apart from these obvious correlations, there are other costs that are not so obvious. Specifically, while most manufacturing jobs offer good benefits like health insurance and pensions, many service sector jobs do not." 9 Such developments increase the burden on federal agencies as outsourced workers and their families become dependent on government entitlements such as welfare, Medicaid, unemployment benefits, and worker It is not hard to imagine that moving such a large class of workers to lower paying jobs has some negative impact on the economy.
PART IV: THE FREE TRADE DEBATE-TRADE PROMOTION VS. TRADE PROTECTIONISM It seems that free trade has negatively impacted U.S. manufacturing, at least to some degree. However, should the Obama administration take steps to protect U.S. manufacturing jobs moving forward? The history of U.S. trade policy indicates the answer is no. So-called "protectionist" actions commonly risk significant damage to other sectors of the economy while providing little, if any, benefits. In recent history, the United States has implemented various policies that could be classified as "protectionist."o Like the current concern over the U.S. manufacturing sector, these policies were similarly aimed at protecting specific sectors of the U.S. economy from the negative impacts of foreign competition. In many instances, the policies backfired, inflicting far more harm than good.
It is widely believed that the imposition of protectionist policies in the form of the artificial inhibition of free trade leads to an array of negative consequences. The Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve has specified a few consequences of protectionist policies that include: the reduction of variety and increased costs for consumers, the distortion of the "allocation of resources in the economy by encouraging excessive resources to flow into protected sectors," and the fostering of inefficiency through the reduction of competition.1 3 ' Vice Chairman Ferguson suggests that other related and "highly egregious" consequences of protectionist actions are of even more consequence to the general public.1 32 He first identifies the risk that protectionist policies in the form of "import barriers" may destroy jobs in "downstream" sectors, in many cases offsetting the number of jobs protected. 3 3 Secondly, Ferguson claims that protectionist policies provide large benefits to a very small number of producers in a given sector, while providing almost no benefits to the majority of producers in the same and other sectors.1 34 A third concern highlighted by Ferguson is that through The results culminated in a deep and prolonged depression, paralyzing the economic powers of the world.141
Unfortunately, the history of U.S. protectionist policy did not end with the Great Depression. More recent examples have manifested the negative consequences highlighted by Chairman Ferguson. These include the Steel Tariffs of 2002, the protection of the U.S. sugar industry, and the recent protection of consumer goods such as shoes and apparel.1 42 The traditional concerns associated with protectionist policies were manifested in each situation, and the study of these policies should educate lawmakers considering future policy choices.
Looking at the Steel Tariffs of 2002 in particular illustrates the danger of protectionist policies and the consequences of introducing artificial barriers to the free flow of commerce. In 2002, the Bush administration authorized a system of steel tariffs to stem the effect of strong foreign competition to the U.S. steel industry. 143 The policy implemented tariffs on select foreign steel bound for the United States that averaged 30%.'4 Shortly after the imposition of these tariffs, steel prices rose across the board by as much as ten percent which raised the costs to U.S. consumers of various steel goods. The Steel Tariffs of 2002 should serve as a warning to President Obama and other policy makers currently under pressure to protect the U.S. manufacturing sector. Just as the steel tariffs had the unintended consequence of eliminating jobs in other sectors of the economy, taking steps to protect U.S. manufacturing jobs could likely have negative costs for the rest of the economy. While the question of whether any actions can be taken to save U.S. manufacturing is still up for debate, new ideas are starting to trickle out of Washington that would provide aid without burdening the benefits of free trade.
PART V: SOLUTIONS--TRADE AGREEMENT PARITY AND THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONE PROGRAM
A. Trade Promotion Authority Proposal
To his credit, President Obama has recently warned of the potential consequences of showing any signs of protectionism.1 48 In a time of economic uncertainty, Obama believes that there will be a strong impulse for economies of the world to adopt such policies, which, as seen with the Smoot-Hawley legislation,1 4 9 can only exacerbate the problems of a depressed economy.so The question remains then, are there any steps that President Obama can take to ease the harm to the U.S. manufacturing sector that he directly attributes to the effects of free trade?"' Furthermore, how can aid be provided without showing any "signals of protectionism" which he has recently warned against?
One 154 The key aspect of the proposal lies in the fact that it provides immediate aid to U.S. manufacturing without implementing artificial limits on free trade.
To stay competitive in today's globalized economy, manufacturers need to use parts from around the world while balancing both quality and price. 15 ' This conforms to traditional notions of free trade given that it is most efficient to take advantage of those trade relationships in which components can be the most cheaply obtained.' 56 The effective practice of this concept passes savings on to the public and increases the revenue for the producer. This would seem to be the theory behind NAFTA and other U.S.-FTAs. However, U.S. manufacturers have been disadvantaged under the current framework requiring them to pay higher tariffs on imports than their FTA competitors. 57 In essence, many U.S. trading partners currently "allow components to enter their countries duty-free, so their manufacturers can produce high quality goods at competitive prices."' 58 In contrast, U.S. manufacturers are not extended similar advantages on imported components.' 59 In many cases, the tariff incentives are enough that a U.S. producer has no other choice but to move its production to take advantage of the incentives.
Tariff incentives created by U.S.-FTAs are the equivalent of an unlevel playing field.' 60 The resulting inequity of this playing field is the artificial incentive for U.S. manufacturers to leave the United States, taking many jobs with them. The genius of TAP is its ability to look beyond the greatest threat to U.S. manufacturing, free trade, and target a specific disadvantage to U.S.-based companies. TAP levels the playing field by addressing the gap in U.S. Customs policy that is left by U.S.-FTAs.161 While U.S.-FTAs provide natural benefits in the form of lower labor, input, and distribution costs to U.S manufacturers willing to move production to an FTA partner, they are not designed to encourage the decline of U.S. manufacturing by offering tax breaks to all those willing to exit the U.S. economy. 16 2 The latter is an artificial benefit, and U.S. trade policy should not encourage domestic manufacturers to move production abroad.
The following example illustrates the problem. 63 Under NAFTA, an automobile assembled in Mexico, consisting of components from Asia that were not taxed prior to their admission to Mexico, may potentially be shipped to the U.S. market without the manufacturer having paid any taxes. 6
Conversely, the same automobile consisting of the same components, but assembled in the United States, may be subjected to tariffs for the Asian-sourced components not taxed when the assembly occurred in Mexico. The current regime has effectively stacked the deck against U.S. manufacturers. TAP is aimed at remedying this inequity. the U.S. economy aids in understanding Rep. Pascrell's proposed changes.
B. The United States Foreign Trade Zone Program
"The Foreign Trade Zone is an area inside United States territory which, for customs purposes, is considered outside of United States Customs territory."' 7 ' The U.S.-FTZ program has always been a way to mitigate some of the adverse effects resulting from increased participation in free trade relationships. 177. See generally Kannellis, supra note 171, at 610 (explaining that U.S. ports could have helped the United States benefit from the global economy but were burdened by customs procedures).
178. Id. exports" 9 had fallen from "147 million dollars worth of activity in 1920 to less than 63 million dollars in 1930." 180 The decline in re-exports was traced directly to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which imposed a prohibitively high set of tariff rates.' 8 Passed in 1934 by a near three to one margin,182 the FTZ program was intended to limit the harmful effects of Smoot-Hawley, by that time considered an economic disaster.183
The prevalent theme of FTZs in America was borrowed from the historic free port paradigm.1 8 4 Although the framework "was inspired by the historic free port archetype, the U.S. version of the free [trade] zone was viewed not as a restatement of the classic form, but rather as a variation of it -a sort of new world opus."' 8 5
The program was designed to aid businesses in dealing with various customs requirements and eventually to jumpstart American trade.' 86 This resulting structure has proven very resilient to changes in the global economy throughout the 2 0 th century and has also proven to be a useful tool in controlling several aspects of the U.S.
economy.187
Congress originally intended FTZ legislation to make the United States a major player in international trade. Specifically, Congress believed that the creation of FTZs, along with the United States' ideal location, would encourage the rest of the world to utilize the United States as a critical trans-shipment point for international trade.' 88 Ultimately, the intent was for the increased capital investment in U.S.-based operations, due to international eagerness to take advantage of the favorable tariff and tax benefits, to promote significant job growth in the country.1 8 9
The Foreign Trade Zone Board is responsible for administering the benefits of U.S.-FTZ operation.1 90 The Board is comprised of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Treasury.' 9 ' The Commissioner of U.S.
"[R]
e-export' means to temporarily move a foreign product into a country for combination with other products and subsequent export." Id.
180. Kanellis, supra note 171, at 610 ("To 're-export' means to temporarily move a foreign product into a country for combination with other products and subsequent export."). Customs and Border Protection also plays a key role on the Board. 92 The Board's primary job is to authorize the creation of Foreign Trade Zones and permit corporate applicants to operate within them.1 9 3 The Board has the ability to exclude "any goods or process of treatment that, in its judgment, is detrimental to the public interest, health, or safety." 94 These broad powers reflect Congressional intent for the Board to play a significant role in U.S. trade policy.
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Evolution of the U.S.-FTZ Program
Only recently has the U.S. The program was not producing the results originally intended, and as worldwide trade developed and changed, the need to modify the U.S-FTZ program became clear. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 200 was passed in 1947, and with it came many changes that would affect the use of U.S.-FTZs. As producers looked for ways to take advantage of the newly developed conditions for international trade, the interest of GATT member nations in the potential of the U.S.-FTZ program was revitalized. 
Advantages Offered by the FTZ Program and Its Current Popularity
Because U.S. Customs only collects duties on products that enter U.S. Customs territory and U.S.-FTZs are considered outside of U.S. Customs territory, products manufactured within a U.S.-FTZ are not subject to duties if shipped directly to the international market.
2 05 The ability to avoid U.S. Customs tariffs is the chief benefit of manufacturing within a U.S.-FTZ.
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Additionally, a company manufacturing within a U.S.-FTZ benefits from the ability to defer applicable duty payments on those items bound for the U.S. market. 207 These benefits allow U.S. manufacturers to circumvent U.S. Customs requirements up until the time when that product reaches Customs territory, if it ever does.
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The U.S.-FTZ program rapidly expanded in the later stages of the 2 0 th century. 209 This expansion was a result of U.S. manufacturers needing the benefits offered by the program to effectively compete in the developing global economy. While only eighteen U.S.-FTZs were in operation in 1973,210 there are more than 500 U.S.-FTZs being utilized by U.S. manufacturers today. 2 1 1 The 2,650 companies operating within U.S.-FTZs are responsible for employing more than 340,000 Americans.212 It is estimated that the use of these zones produces roughly $500 billion in annual economic activity, and the benefits of that money are experienced in all fifty states.
213
C. TAP Applies Fresh Thinking to the US. FTZ Program
Rep. Pascrell's legislation proposes to alter the U.S.-FTZ program making TAP benefits available to those operating within a U.S.-FTZ. 214 TAP enables these manufacturers to acquire the same tariff treatment as producers operating within a U.S. free trade partner without requiring them does not comply with NAFTA's rules of origin, 2 26 U.S. Customs will tax that product if shipped to the United States. Furthermore, if a U.S. manufacturer uses the same components, it will not be permitted to use TAP as a shield from the same tariffs. TAP is only capable of providing the benefits actually accessible to a manufacturer under an existing U.S.-FTA.
PART VI: PROPOSALS
A. Congress Should Immediately Consider and Pass TAP
"TAP is the single-best job creation plan for American manufacturing workers that Washington can offer today." 227 It avoids implementing harmful protectionist policies, but limits the competitive advantage offered to companies that relocate manufacturing jobs outside of the United States. As more U.S.-FTAs are passed and pursued, the U.S. manufacturer is put at a growing disadvantage. Under TAP, serving the domestic and global economies from a manufacturing base within the United States will once again be a viable option. Without TAP, or similar legislation, the competitive advantage offered to those manufacturers producing goods abroad will continue to escalate.
TAP will provide immediate and significant benefits to the American economy. 228 A recent study commissioned by the National Association of Foreign Trade Zones (NAFTZ) reflects these benefits.
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The study, conducted through the Peterson Institute for International EconomicS 230 by economists Dean DeRosa 23 1' and Gary Hufbauer, 232 estimates that TAP's implementation will result in a $530 million annual gain to the U.S. economy. 233 Perhaps more important given the current concerns of the Obama administration, the study estimates that 95,000 new jobs will be created within existing U.S.-FTZs. The real benefits from TAP may not be quantified in the study. Specifically, TAP may have some success in reversing the domino effect that occurs when a U.S. manufacturer leaves the United States. Currently, once a manufacturer is given enough incentive to move production abroad, a natural domino effect impacts part and component manufacturers down the economic line. By making it less likely for the first company to leave, TAP may stem the domino effect and, in fact, influence some dominos to 236 fall in the opposite direction.
As manufacturing prospers within U.S.-FTZs, part and component manufacturers operating both in and out of U.S.-FTZs will also benefit.
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This probability suggests that the estimated 95,000 jobs created in U.S.-FTZs by TAP are not fully representative of the ultimate impact TAP will have on U.S. employment.
The Need for "Real" Free Trade
Currently, trade is not "free" for U.S. manufacturers because of tax penalties associated with operating in the United States. 238 Some may argue that it is the natural progression of an economy to move from a manufacturing and industrial power to more of a service power, exporting the production of goods for the efficiency of the overall economy. These arguments are consistent with the rationalization for integrated world economies and free trade agreements in general.
23 9 Adam Smith, 240 perhaps the world's first economist, expressed the logic of these views:
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy.. . If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. Perhaps absent the disincentive of the current tariff structure, some manufacturers would never have chosen to leave the United States. The natural effects of free trade agreements combined with the current tariff structure have provided the American worker with a jarring introduction to the global economy. TAP is not a silver bullet for the ailing manufacturing sector, but it is a substantial step towards making U.S. manufacturers competitive again. TAP cannot remove the benefits of favorable employment and operation costs available in U.S. free trade partners, and it should not. Even if there were no free trade agreements, U.S. manufacturers would still look to invest in developing economies like China and Mexico. 242 In many cases it will still be more efficient for them to do so. 243 However, removing current tariff incentives will once again make the United States market a viable option for U.S.-based manufacturing. 2 44 By removing one incentive to serve the U.S. market from abroad, the cost-benefit analysis of leaving the United States shifts and the chances of the United States retaining domestic manufacturing companies and attracting new ones becomes much greater.
The "Old" Concept of "Trade Parity"
Trade parity is not a new concept in the arena of international trade. In the past, it has been strived for by many economies in North America. 245 It most recently has been at the forefront of the push for free trade expansion under the Bush administration.
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After broad trade and economic benefits were granted to Mexico through NAFTA, the majority of similarly situated North American economies expressed aspirations of trade parity or "NAFTA parity." 2 47 These nations sought benefits equivalent to those which Mexico enjoyed. Specifically, they hoped for equitable access to two of the largest economies in the Western Hemisphere, the United States and Canada. Furthermore, another trade agreement is currently under negotiation, the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA), 25 1 that seeks to expand "NAFTA-parity" to even more nations. The battle cry of nations seeking trade-parity is that they are "not seeking handouts, but only the opportunity not to be prevented from taking full advantage of the North American market." The benefits for countries seeking "NAFTA parity" can be summed up as a "leveling of the playing field." They only ask for the opportunity to effectively compete with countries like Mexico to serve the larger economies of North America. With the passage of TPA and the flood of FTAs that followed, 254 many of these nations have been granted this opportunity.255 In fact, over much of the last decade delivering trade parity to U.S. trading partners has dominated U.S. trade policy.
56
While it has been a top priority to ensure that other nations in North America have the ability to compete in the U.S. economy, little attention has been paid to the domestic manufacturers burdened by the similar disadvantages. Like those nations seeking "NAFTA-parity," the U.S. manufacturing sector does not need a handout to remain competitive in the global economy. They simply need to operate on a level playing field with their competition. Like "NAFTA-parity," TAP delivers the ability to compete in the North American market to U.S. manufacturers. is potential concern that without this regulation, TAP's implementation could actually contribute to the decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs.
68
If TAP benefits were universally available, a producer operating inside a U.S.-FTZ could simply import duty free parts and components to the detriment of U.S. based producers. However, the FTZ Board's charge to restrict or prohibit any product or activity that it finds "detrimental to the public interest," 2 69 gives it the necessary tools to limit these potential abuses. The Board's strong regulation of TAP will ensure the maximum benefit for U.S. manufacturers, but there are additional safeguards. Any U.S. company fearing harm from an individual grant of TAP benefits is permitted to directly object to the Board's grant of those benefits. 270 This mechanism, along with the Boards strict regulation, will ensure that no application for TAP benefits will be granted if it risks sacrificing jobs in another sector of the economy. Strict application of the Board's "public interest" requirement in both of these situations will ensure that only companies manufacturing in the United States and creating jobs for U.S. workers will receive the beneficial aspects of TAP legislation.
C. Conclusion
Current U.S.-FTAs have created a tariff structure that provides benefits to those manufacturers that leave U.S. territory. 2 71 Government encouragement of our own manufacturers to leave, and take thousands of U.S. jobs with them, is an unacceptable consequence of free trade. The current administration should push for the passage of TAP as a way to remedy the situation. "TAP is a win-win for U.S.-based companies and U.S. workers, and deserves strong bipartisan support in Congress." 27 2 Ultimately, even if TAP is not passed, a bill that levels the playing field for U.S. manufacturing is needed. Not only would this initiative aid the quest of many politicians seeking to "save manufacturing," 2 7 3 it would create a substantial number of jobs, the current emphasis of President Obama. 274 To "save" U.S. manufacturing, Congress must take steps to once again make U.S. manufacturing a viable choice. Trade Agreement Parity has the ability to deliver just that. 
